

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

OPA

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Your Memorandum of 4 December on TNF []

1. I have read your memorandum of 4 December on "Possible Soviet Responses to an Affirmative NATO Decision on TNF Modernization"

[] I was very much intrigued by the line of reasoning on the bottom half of page 4, page 5, and the top half of page 6. I have been seeking for some time to understand the different perspectives on who is ahead in TNF. It is difficult to get a U.S. presentation of this that doesn't show us hopelessly behind. You, I believe, have summarized it here in what is a more realistic manner--it could be viewed as though we are behind, about even, or well ahead depending upon the counting rules. []

2. Could you reduce this to a matrix? The first row would show comparison of U.S. and Soviet systems with ranges in excess of 1000 kilometers. A column at the right-hand side would indicate that in this category the Soviets would have to see themselves as coming out on top. []

Next, there would be a row for systems with ranges less than 1000 kilometers. Graphically, this could be divided into systems that we would count and systems that the Soviets would likely count--taking into account your point on the capability of aircraft versus the availability of pilots. Again in the right-hand column we could show how this one could tilt. []

A final row would add in the non-U.S. NATO systems and show how that again tips the balance. []

3. In addition to this table, we would then go on with your discussion as to the acceptability of a freeze if the Soviets do look

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25X1 at themselves as ahead, and hence the possibility that they would be willing to freeze. Hopefully, this might be reduced to short enough length for a PDB annex.

for
STANSFIELD TURNER

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